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INTRODUCTION
The first philosophers, the investigators of the world, wanted to find out 
how things were, and so, in the words of Pythagoras, quoted by Cicero, 
they “earnestly inquired into the essence of things, (…) nobly behold­
ing the world and gaining nothing for themselves.”1 They wanted to know 
the truth. First about the external world and then about God, man, values, 
social relations, etc. The pursuit of truth characterized the first philoso­
phers and one of them, Aristotle, even claimed that truth is more impor­
tant than friendship (amicus Plato sed magis amica est veritas).
The classic definition of truth is found in Aristotle, who says in the 
Metaphysics: “To assert of Being that it does not exist, or of Non-Being 
that it exists, is false; but to assert that Being exists and Non-Being does 
not exist is true.”2
In the Middle Ages, thanks to Albert the Great and St. Thomas, truth 
was understood as the correspondence or compatibility of thoughts and 
things (veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus). This definition, called the 
correspondence definition of truth, said that thought A is true if there is 
a corresponding fact in reality that corresponds to that thought. The thought 
“it is snowing” is true if it is actually snowing. 
These definitions presupposed a kind of correlation between language 
and the world and were dominant in philosophy and, in the modern sci­
ence that emerged from it. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas as well as Co­
pernicus, Kepler, and Newton believed that they were discovering truth, 
whether that truth was metaphysical or physical. This belief was based on 
1 Aristotle. 1988. Zachęta do filozofii (trans. Leśniak K.), Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, pp. XIV–XV. All English translations by Monika Banaś and Da­
riusz Juruś. 
2 Aristotle. 1983. Metafizyka (trans. Leśniak K.), Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnic­
two Naukowe, p. 1011b.
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the conviction that the world was written in some language that humans 
could read (this fact may cause surprise, which was expressed by Albert 
Einstein when he said: “The most incomprehensible thing about the uni­
verse is that it is comprehensible”3). Medieval philosophers and modern 
scientists implicitly assumed that since there exists a language that ade­
quately describes something objective, (i.e. something that is not a product 
of our mind), there must exist something or Someone who recorded this 
knowledge. Such a statement led to realism, which is the conviction that 
the world exists in reality and is not a product of human consciousness.
With the emergence of the so-called coherent and pragmatic con­
ception of truth at the end of the 19th century, the previous vision of the 
world was questioned. The coherentist definition of truth, associated with 
Francis H. Bradley, lacked Hegelian metaphysical aura, proclaims that:
“a) no judgment is independent and cannot be evaluated in terms of 
truth and falsity if considered outside the system, 
b) every judgment belonging to the system follows logically from the 
conjunction of the other judgments of that system.”4 
Truth here ceases to consist in correspondence but becomes a certain 
formal feature; what matters is the coherence of beliefs, not their content. 
The real existence of the world in this case is redundant.
William James, the founder of pragmatism, defined truth in terms of 
utility. According to him, a judgment is true if and only if practical conse­
quences follow from it. Truth, then, is not again a correspondence between 
thought and objective reality, but becomes a utility function. Truth is the 
correlate of action and not of thought. This view of truth consequently 
leads to the relativisation and subjectivisation of knowledge.
At the end of the twentieth century, a deflationary theory emerged, 
whose proponents maintained that the predicate of truthfulness does not 
express any general feature that all true propositions possess. There is no 
“nature” or “essence” of truth, that can be investigated. Therefore, the 
concept of truth cannot be the object of any analysis. 
The neo-pragmatists, on the other hand, led by Richard Rorty, have 
stated that truth is a useless tool that should for the good of society be 
3 Quote after: J. C. Lennox. 2018. Czy nauka pogrzebała Boga? (trans. Gomola G. & A.), 
Poznań: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów „W drodze”, p. 118.
4 Hempoliński M. 1989. Filozofia współczesna. Wprowadzenie do zagadnień i kierun-
ków, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwa Naukowe, p. 547.
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disposed of as soon as possible. They also questioned the idea of the cor­
respondence between language and the world. As Rorty stated the world 
does not speak to us in any particular language, it is we who speak. “To 
say that truth is not outside is simply as much as to say that where there 
are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human 
languages, and languages are creations of man.”5 
For the postmodernists who, according to Ernest Gellner, are, in the 
matter of truth, the heirs of the Marxists, truth as a claim to objectivity 
and thus to universality is an element of enslavement and as such a threat 
to freedom.6
In such a situation, the emergence of post-truth was natural. For since 
truth is founded neither in God, for as Nietzsche declared: “God is dead,” 
nor in objective reality (“truth is a mobile army of metaphors,” also Ni­
etzsche) there is nothing left to do but to assume that truth no longer ex­
ists, and that all disputes are merely emotive in nature. After all, appealing 
to emotion is more pragmatic than appealing to reason.
The rejection of the notion of objective truth is particularly evident in 
the humanities (Einstein and Gödel had no doubts about its existence), es­
pecially where cultural relativism is the yardstick of truth.
It seems that in such a situation every reflection on, and in defence of, 
the objective truth, especially on the ground of the humanities, is valuable.
For this reason we offer our readers a collection of articles focused on 
the tension growing between truth and post-truth for at least several dec­
ades. This troubled relationship has been presented from several perspec­
tives of humanities, social- and natural sciences. This allows us to empha­
size the multitude of areas in which man, in his individual and collective 
existence, tries to name and recognize the objects and phenomena that 
shape him. The examples analysed in the particular papers of this journal 
show how difficult it is. 
Monika Banaś, Dariusz Juruś
5 Rorty R. 2009. Przygodność, ironia i solidarność (trans. Popowski W.J.), Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo W.A.B., p. 23.
6 Gellner E. 1997. Postmodernizm, rozum i religia, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut 
Wydawniczy, pp. 45–51.
